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The text is a diachronic presentation of the development of neo-Ottoman 
ideology in Turkey. After six decades of secular Kemalism that assimilated 
minorities under a single Turkish identity, Turgot Özal’s government progres-
sively reintroduced elements of Islam in Turkish public life and revived the 
19th-century concept of Ottomanism involving a multi-cultural, multi-lingual 
and multi-religious state. Islamic spiritual movements contributed to the start 
of formation of a new Turkish identity with a strong Ottoman Islamic character 
This process has been continued under the rule of the AKP, a party rooted in 
Islamic tradition but active in foreign policy. According to the party theoreti-
cian Ahmed Davutoğlu, the Middle East turmoil results from the destruction of 
Ottoman cosmopolitanism by the European model of secularism and political 
nationalism and Turkey can be a pivotal state in the region. The AKP perceives 
Islam as a key for a new identity that will unify the various domestic ethnic 
groups and a way to calm regional instability while its current foreign policy 
carries strong pan-Ottoman undertones.
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Introduction
Behind Turkey’s development over the last three decades, a new identity can 
be traced that is focused on a worldview (German: Weltanschauung) defined 
as neo-Ottoman. This has been fostered by Turkish society gradually embrac-
ing elements from its imperial past and, more particularly, from the nineteenth 
century political ideology known as Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism is well-
established and accepted as a general way of thinking and living in modern 
Turkey. Its reference is to Turkey’s glorious and ambitious past and a revival of 
its Islamic roots. Nevertheless, the term neo-Ottomanism is still rarely accepted 
and used by Turkish political establishment, which rejects its use for fear that 
it might arouse unwanted references to a period of “neo-imperialism” or even 
worse, of “neo-caliphate”.
The aim of this work is to present a worldview of the historical developments 
of neo-Ottomanism and to define in a broad sense its basic elements and roots. 
For this purpose, the work uses a diachronic analysis that facilitates rehabilita-
tion of an Ottoman-Islamic identity.
1. The Ottomanism behind Özalism
The victorious election of Turgot Özal in 1983 represented the beginning of 
a break with the policies of the previous sixty years of the Turkish Republic 
which had been shaped along the values of Kemalism or Atatürkism. Özal’s 
rise to power proved decisive for the beginning of changes that have pushed 
Turkey towards an ever more decisive transformation in which the progressive 
reinstatement of Islam in both private and public sectors plays a central role.
The Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) led by Özal presented itself 
as a mix of the four major political ideologies of the Seventies (right, left, Islamic 
fundamentalism and radical right). Held together by Özal’s charisma, these 
ideological forces won favour especially among the emerging middle classes, 
who would have enjoyed the economic policies implemented by the new govern-
ment. This Muslim bourgeoisie was connected with the Anatolian provinces, 
and as such was further away from Ankara’s secular establishment and more 
linked to religious and mystical tradition.
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The liberal reforms promoted by Özal and the gradual rehabilitation of 
Islamic values in the public sphere helped stimulate the emergence of an alter-
native culture, autonomous from Kemalism. Concurrently, the secular-army 
establishment modified state ideology with the adoption of the Türk-İslam 
Sentezi (Turkish-Islamic synthesis). Turkish-Islamic synthesis was formulated 
by a group of intellectuals known as Aydınlar Ocağı (hearth of the intellectuals) 
and dealt with the idea that Islamic culture was a moral complement necessary 
to strengthen the order of values embodied in Turkish nationalism. The adop-
tion of Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an integral part of state ideology helped 
to temper Islamist thinking. Thus the combination of several domestic factors 
brought about new room for public expression of religion and no longer confined 
to the private sphere, it assumed a collective identity-making value that does not 
deny modernity but experiences and professes a new way of life of which the 
central parts are Islamic ethics and the recovery of its long denied Ottoman past.
Özal realized that a new definition of Turkish identity was necessary to 
replace Kemalism, which was no longer considered suitable to effect social and 
global changes. Mustafa Kemal defined Turkish identity by a common linguistic 
and territorial nationality and rejected multi-culturalism that had represented 
one of the main pillars of the Ottoman Empire. Such a strict assimilationist view 
led to greater ethnic discrimination than under the Ottoman Empire, during 
which time cultural, religious and ethnic cohabitation was accepted as a national 
trait for centuries.
To the contrary, Özal considered the different ethnic, cultural, religious, 
linguistic and political traits as organic parts of a new national identity which 
was able to assume a more Ottoman perspective than one solely of Turkish 
nature. Özal’s Turkism was a cultural concept that did not tend to clash with 
Turkey’s ethnic minorities but was rather aimed at understanding them under 
the broader concept of Turks, or more precisely, under the wider concept of 
Ottomans. If Mustafa Kemal dreamt of a secularized and Westernized soci-
ety, Özal wanted a democratic, Muslim, liberal and capitalist society, enclosed 
within a state system that was multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious.
In this meaning there are several aspects of imperial Ottomanism (Osmanli-
lik), a concept developed during the period of the Tanzimat reforms (1839–1876) 
by the bureaucratic elite. Ottomanism is derived from the idea that all Ottoman 
citizens should enjoy the same status within the empire, regardless of their 
ethnicity, religion or language. However, his was a purely formal concept, which 
only found full application in 1869 with the advent of the Ottoman citizenship 
law and represented the empire’s first identity-making process. Paradoxically, 
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the failed attempt to spread a modern concept of citizenship, turned out to be 
one of the main factors that accelerated the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In-
deed, Ottomanism undermined the legitimate basis of the millet administrative 
system, which for four centuries had represented the best expression of Ottoman 
religious tolerance. The millet system was a result of the “pragmatic” belief that 
the acceptance of differences was necessary for the survival of a multi-confes-
sional and multi-national reality. The peaceful co-existence of a multiplicity of 
identities with flexible boundaries, which for centuries had been the backbone of 
the Ottoman society, crumbled.
An analysis of Ottomanism shows its evolution in three different stages and 
declinations between 1856 and 1882, which were each influenced by specific 
historical circumstances and driven by the common desire to stop the empire. 
The first phase (1856), defined as liberal Ottomanism, was characterized by the 
ideas of several members of the Porte, Grand Vizier Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha 
who called for a new understanding of citizenship as a base of union of the 
various imperial ethnic groups (Ittihad-i Ansar). The second phase (1870–1878) 
was instead focused on an alternative vision promoted by a group of intellectual 
reformers known as the Young Ottomans, who tried to carry out mediation 
between the European thought (liberalism, constitutionalism) and the Islamic 
nature of the Ottoman state. The Young Ottomans coined the idea of union of 
elements, referring to the Muslim community (Ittihad-i Islam), considered in its 
original form as an embryonic democracy. Finally, the third phase (1880–1908) 
was outlined by Sultan Abdülhamit II who, following the Treaty of Berlin of 
1878, emphasized the Islamic character of his authority. In order to legitimize 
his role, the Sultan gave rise to a form of defensive pan-Islamism to compact the 
Ottoman-Muslim community around the symbols of Islamic tradition as Caliph 
and Caliphate. Despite its evolutions, Ottomanism failed the challenge of many 
centrifugal forces that eventually weakened the Ottoman centre and structure, 
making it easy prey for European imperialist ambitions.
Besides the identity-making aspect, Özal’s reference to Ottomanism was also 
connected with another element that could no longer be underestimated by the 
Turkish government: the presence of a large number of migrants coming from 
neighbouring regions. Since the Republic’s birth in 1923, many ethnic groups 
have been forced to assimilate Turkish identity, abandoning any form of political 
and community representation. This did not prevent the ethnic group’s progres-
sive growth, which during the Eighties resulted in pressure from groups whose 
influence could no longer be ignored. Özal became aware of this further impor-
tant change and came to the belief that the needs of the many ethnic groups had 
HISTORICAL REFLECTION ON NEO-OTTOMAN WELTANSCHAUUNG  59
to find their answers in Turkey’s policies. A consideration that became crucial for 
Özal’s foreign policy was aimed at recovering better relations with neighbouring 
countries and the former Ottoman provinces. Turkey was in the position that it 
could no longer ignore what was happening beyond its borders as a more active 
policy was expressly required by many ethnic pressure groups.
The term “neo-Ottomanism” was introduced in the mid-Eighties to define 
Turkey’s growing geo-political engagement and remains present today as a no-
tion that is eminently used by academics and journalists. At this stage neo-Ot-
tomanism, better defined as Özalism, emerged in relation to a new foreign policy 
agenda driven by the idea that Turkey could, and should, play an important role 
as a regional power. Özalism, as a reaction to the traditional security-oriented 
approach, became functional to the protection of Turkey’s economic interests 
worldwide. The Özal government tried to re-establish a pro-Western attitude 
by strengthening ties with both the United States and Europe while at the same 
time Turkey expanded relations with other regions such as the Balkans and Mid-
dle East. Afterwards, in the early Nineties, Turkey successfully created room to 
operate in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.
Özalism introduced several new elements in Turkish foreign policy as the 
cultural dimension that has always played a key role in the neo-Ottoman vi-
sion. The ANAP government increased the use of soft power towards the former 
Ottoman provinces, anticipating what would have been the prerogative of AKP 
governments. However, unlike the AKP’s foreign policy agenda, Özal could 
not enjoy a large operating space because Turkey did not yet have a strong and 
reliable economy. Özal is therefore merited with emancipating concepts such 
as Islamism and Ottomanism, which for years the Turkish secular elite had 
believed to be dangerous for Turkey, and it was he who created values for them 
on which to establish new regional ties.
2. The rise of conservative democracy
 and pro-Islamic civil society
The rise to power of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development 
Party, AKP) in the 2002 election was a turning point of Turkish politics. The 
specificity of this case lies in the Necmettin Erbakanh’s Milli Gorus movement 
and its ability to produce a ruling party that, although rooted in the Islamic 
tradition, has succeeded in combining Islam with democracy and found re-
markable free market opportunities and openings in the West, particularly in 
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the European Union. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AKP 
left behind not only fifty years of secular Kemalism but also political Islamic 
tradition, through a gradual process of institutionalization.
The AKP presented itself as a conservative democratic party, a platform able 
to fully meet the needs and ambitions of the new entrepreneurial class devel-
oped in the provinces, the so-called Anatolian Tigers. This new Muslim middle 
class looked upon the EU and globalization not as poisoned fruits of Western 
imperialism, but rather as an opportunity for greater freedom in various areas, 
including those of a religious nature. This group soon became a counter elite 
in which Islam is not a political horizon but rather an integrated way of life, in 
which traditional religious values are combined with the ethics of hard work, 
innovation and sober economic management. It was the approach that resumed 
the process undertaken by the Calvinist European bourgeoisie which began in 
the sixteenth century. For this reason, this middle class is labelled as “Islamic 
Calvinism”, which combines the traits commonly attributed to Protestant ethics 
with strict Islamic observance.
The Midnight Statement of 2007 became the last attempt by the army to in-
terfere in the political and institutional affairs of the state and also marked a de-
cisive shift in the AKP political paradigm which assumed a more pronounced 
Islamic trait. The main effects of this change occurred in foreign policy, with the 
gradual detachment from long-term partners such as Israel and with the adop-
tion of more Islamic arguments. In domestic policy, the AKP was able to bring 
forward the transformation of the whole Turkish public thanks to the introduc-
tion of its own élite in the various state administrative apparatus and cadres 
(education, economics, information, religious affairs). This was the outcome of 
a process following the coup d’état of 1980, when the military junta promoted 
de-politicization of the society and resizing of the pluralist democracy, restrict-
ing any form of political participation and expression or any correlated actions, 
including activities performed by many civil society organizations. There was 
a widening of the gap between the state and society, in which the void left by 
the total absence of parties and other socio-political organizations was gradu-
ally filled by new forms of associations linked to the networks of popular Islam, 
which became an element of social cohesiveness and integration.
These forms of social Islam, taking advantage of their strong variable and 
elusive spiritual character, which over the years had allowed the survival and 
underground spread of popular Islam,. in a short time succeeded in both ex-
panding the intervention in the public sphere and promoting the development 
of a new civil society.
HISTORICAL REFLECTION ON NEO-OTTOMAN WELTANSCHAUUNG  61
During its early years in power, the AKP was able to use the drive of the 
economic élite and, more generally, of this young pro-Islamic civil society in 
order to accelerate institution of a de-securitization process. The electoral vote 
in favour of the AKP, therefore, should be looked upon as the desire of civil 
society to legitimize a new actor with the implicit mandate to restructure the 
boundaries between State and society.
The progressive reinstatement of Islam to the Turkish public has gradually 
neutralized the threat of radical Islamism and at the same time promoted a pos-
sible solution to sensitive domestic issues, such as the Kurdish one, represented by 
the re-emergence of a multi-ethnic identity that, unlike the Kemalist approach, 
merges the ethnic diversities rather than assimilating them.
The rapid re-emergence of the Islamic movements was due to the failure of the 
Kemalist populism to produce its own code of ethics and its inability to provide 
an alternative and credible framework comparable to the Islamic virtues (fazilet). 
Virtues present in several Islamic social movements have facilitated the develop-
ment of a new Turkish identity with a strong Ottoman Islamic character. These 
popular movements have spread a different idea of Islam, not coming from the 
mosques and sermons of the ulama but from newspapers, TVs, private schools as 
well as from many urban intellectuals who, in the ‘80s and ‘90s became involved 
in shaping their own modern version of Islam to be transmitted to the masses.
3. A neo-Ottoman Weltanschauung in the AKP era
The AKP’s victory has merely revealed a process that has been embedded in 
Turkish society, highlighting the idea of neo-Ottomanism, a term that is often 
improperly used to indicate Turkish foreign policy tout court. The socio-political 
dynamics of the previous years triggered a process powered by the Muslim mid-
dle class in which reference to its own history and traditions, in particular to 
the Ottoman cosmopolitism took centre place. A new discourse emerged which 
stressed that ancient ties between people of different ethnicities and religions 
could reintroduce Turkey into the global stage and proposed a hybrid model 
of Pax Ottomanica (meeting of civilizations alternative to the Huntington’s 
“clash”) that was able to mediate the complex relation between Islam, modernity 
and democracy. Under the AKP government, Turkey is and must remain a na-
tional State; however, it acquired a more imperial vision of its own identity – in 
this sense, neo-Ottoman. This is an all-embracing way of thinking and living in 
present and future modern Turkey, referring to its glorious and ambitious past, 
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which for decades has been viewed as troublesome; it promotes the recovery of 
a common Ottoman-Islamic tolerant and inclusive identity.
In the notion of neo-Ottomanism there is a synthesis of identity-making 
elements that have characterized different historical phases of Turkish Ottoman 
reality in the last two centuries. The evolution of this concept has led to different 
outcomes: domestic policy has seen the promotion of a new idea of citizenship 
aimed at gradually recognizing Turkey’s Muslim minorities (above all facing 
the delicate Kurdish and Alevi issues) and foreign policy has experienced a new 
dynamic, multidirectional and multidimensional attitude. Another effect of this 
process is the promotion of a neo-Ottoman Weltanschauung, necessary both to 
fill the void innate to Turkish identity, which for too many decades was built 
on the idea of loss rather than conquest, and to give greater self-confidence 
to Turkish society. This vision, combined with a strong feeling of revenge and 
pride, feeds that idea of grandeur that neo-Ottomanism tries to meet through 
a pro-active foreign policy.
With the rise of the AKP, Turkey’s geopolitical centrality has begun to 
develop and has defined a new direction in foreign policy that follows the guide-
lines elaborated by International Relations Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu in his 
academic works. Davutoğlu’s theories focus on the rhetoric of “the meeting of 
civilizations”, which is part of the broader and more complex framework of neo-
Ottomanism and is aimed at transforming Turkey from its status as a peripheral 
state during the Cold War era to a global actor or central state. The key asset 
of Davutoğlu’s geopolitical doctrine, known as “Strategic Depth” is the gradual 
recovery of Ottoman Islamic heritage. The core idea of this approach is that the 
AKP no longer considers its imperial past as a destabilizing factor, as believed 
by Kemalists, but as a common denominator (ortak payda) among peoples of the 
neighbouring regions. In addition to the return to Ottoman Islamic inheritance, 
the Turkish government adopted a foreign policy that reflects activism in the 
former territories of the empire in the political, economic and cultural spheres. 
This push was not aimed at pursuing a phase of neo-imperialism but rather at 
increasing widespread use of soft power in the former Ottoman provinces to 
create and manage a new regional order.
The AKP government’s ambitions to make Turkey a pivotal state of a com-
prehensive macro-regional system has been resized by the Syrian crisis and more 
sectarian oriented policies. However, the neo-Ottoman vision has even domestic 
implications, with a review of the concept of national identity, as already under-
stood and started by Özal. Neo-Ottomanism admits openness to Turkey’s nu-
merous ethnic minorities through the development of a multi-cultural concept 
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of citizenship. This concept directly recalls the ideology of Ottomanism and 
its principle of “unity of elements” under an even more specific role. The AKP 
political discourse and agenda accentuates the presence of a strong reference 
to Islamic identity by recalling Ottomanism in its third phase, namely that of 
the Hamidian period. At that time, as previously highlighted, Sultan Abdül-
hamit II covered the idea of Ottomanism with Islamic symbolism as a vehicle 
for consensus and source of new and greater political legitimacy. The Sultan’s 
political choice led to the recovery of the title of Caliph with the intention of 
strengthening internal imperial cohesion, without the assertive traits typical of 
modern pan-Islamism. Likewise, in the AKP vision, Islam can and should be the 
key for a new identity shared by the various domestic ethnic groups; at the same 
time, it could be a useful drug to calm regional instability.
According to Davutoğlu, the current Middle East turmoil is an aftermath 
of the import of the European model of secularism, political nationalism and 
ethnic identity – in other words, the breaking of Ottoman cosmopolitanism. 
For this reason, Davutoğlu has advocated an “alternative paradigm”, the return 
to the historical political legitimacy of the Ottomans as well as Muslim world 
based on two Islamic concepts, Tawhid and Tanzih. In Davutoğlu’s perspective 
Tawhid and Tanzih can lead to making a better society rather than Islamizing 
it. To this we must add how the AK Party establishment, as well as Özal and 
Sultan Abdülhamit II before them, shared a vision of a dynamic and flexible 
Islam, able to adapt and express itself with regard to modernity and democracy. 
This idea was the result of the strong influence exerted on all of them, including 
Erdogan, by important movements of popular Islam – as Sufi orders – which was 
aimed at promoting the Muslim world and intended as ummah, a new teaching 
in which faith and tolerance meet progress and business. This perspective finds 
legitimization in Ottoman history where a tolerant model of confessional plural-
ism allowed centuries of peaceful and fruitful coexistence and prosperity (Pax 
Ottomanica).
Among the current institutions that express a neo-Ottoman worldview are 
Turkish faith-based NGOs which have recently become an important instru-
ment of Turkey’s soft power toolkit. In line with Davutoğlu’s vision, and more 
generally with AKP Weltanschauung, Turkish NGOs are working in different 
regions from Central Asia to Latin America and driven by Muslim humanitari-
anism and a nostalgic view of the hybrid Ottoman-Islamic liberalism based on 
two pillars: the institutionalized system of religious tolerance (millet) and the 
deep-rooted presence in society of charitable foundations (vakiflar). If the millet 
structure had guaranteed a confessional pluralism, the charitable foundations 
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were an embryonic version of civil society organizations, ensuring services 
aimed at meeting the basic needs of people. Today, the reference to the Ottoman 
past is a common ground of legitimacy among the different organizations of 
Turkey’s civil society (business associations, NGOs, charities) and the establish-
ment of the AKP government. For these reasons, Turkey’s foreign policy agenda 
rather than being a declination of pan-Islamism has taken traits of an original 
version of pan-Ottomanism.
Conclusion
This paper analysed some key elements characterizing present-day Turkey, 
focusing on a neo-Ottoman worldview (Weltanschauung) and its implications. 
The aim was to highlight an innovative interpretation of Ottomanism that indis-
solubly relates identity-making policy and foreign policy with the emergence of 
a common Turkish-Ottoman identity as fundamental to promote Turkey’s in-
ternational ambitions. The starting point for these analyses were the innovative 
policies undertaken by the Özal government which have favoured the emergence 
of a new idea of Turkish identity and society characterized by liberalism in the 
economic field, dynamism in the public sphere and activism in foreign policy. 
Today, we should look at neo-Ottomanism as a process still underway, whose 
roots lie in the socio-political dynamics of the 70s and 80s in which cultural 
turmoil led to the emergence of a group of intellectuals and academics (Aydınlar 
Ocağı) who promoted an ideology (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis) in which elements 
of Turkish nationalism met Islam. All these factors under a different guise can be 
seen in AKP’s paradigm and in Turkey’s current international agenda which has 
assumed a strong pan-Ottoman character.
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